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Firm fixed effects alone explain as much of the variation in acquirer returns as all the firm- and
deal-specific characteristics combined. An interquartile range of acquirer fixed effects is over 6%,
comparable to the interquartile range of acquirer returns. Acquirer returns persist over time, but
mainly at the top end of the distribution. Persistence continues under different chief executive
officers (CEOs), and attributes of the broader management team do not explain the fixed effect.
Firm-specific heterogeneity in acquirer returns suggests that some organizations are extra-
ordinary acquirers irrespective of the leadership at the top and the deal structures they choose.
Implications for the M&A research are discussed.
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. Golubov),1. Introduction
The opening quote above motivated Roll's (1986) semi-
nal paper on managerial hubris in takeovers. Strikingly, 30
years after the first review of the early takeover literature
by Jensen and Ruback (1983), their conclusion as to the
elusive nature of takeover gains remains relevant. While
the explosion in large sample studies of mergers and
acquisitions (M&A) over the last three decades has identi-
fied a number of robust determinants of acquirer perfor-
mance, the overall variation in the returns to acqui-
sition activity remains largely unexplained. For example,
a widely cited study by Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz
(2004) examines over 12,000 M&A deals, and, employing
an extensive list of determinants, is able to explain just
over 5% of the variation in acquirer returns (as judged by
the adjusted R2 of their main regression models).1 Similar,ss article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
1 We emphasize that this is not to detract from the contribution of
the Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) study. In fact, the acquirer
size effect they document has proven to be one of the most robust
determinants of acquirer returns; we also confirm it in this paper.
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Xie (2007) and Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell
(2012) report comparably low explanatory powers. If an
exhaustive list of factors in combination does not explain
the widespread variation in acquirer returns in a systema-
tic way, then what does?
At the same time—and in contrast to the commonly
held belief that mergers fail to deliver value—anecdotal
evidence points out some persistent acquisition successes.
Cisco Systems, Berkshire Hathaway, IBM, General Electric,
and Diageo are some notable examples of frequent
acquirers that most observers consider to have been
consistently successful in their acquisitions.2 These exam-
ples suggest that there could be some firm-specific driver
of acquisition success—ignored by prior studies—that can
help explain the cross-sectional variation in takeover
gains. In other words, if there are systematic differences
in the firms' ability to create value through acquisitions
(over and above the known determinants), then we should
observe significant firm-specific components in acquirer
returns.
In this paper we show that acquirer returns are, indeed,
best explained by an unobserved, time-invariant, firm-
specific factor. In line with prior research, we show that
the explanatory power of a comprehensive regression
specification employing most of the widely used firm-
and deal-specific characteristics explains only 5.0–6.4%
(adjusted R2, 3.6–6.0%) of the variation in acquirer returns.
However, augmenting the same regression models with
acquirer fixed effects roughly doubles their explanatory
power. These findings suggest that the source of acquirer
gains is not deal- but rather firm-specific. That is, some
firms are stellar acquirers irrespective of their time-
varying attributes and the deal structures they choose.
The economic magnitude of the fixed effect is staggering.
An interquartile range in acquirer fixed effects is over 6%,
comparable to the interquartile range of the underlying
acquirer cumulative abnormal return (CAR) distribution.
Moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the fixed
effects distribution is associated with $184 million ($28
million) in incremental shareholder value creation for a
mean-(median)-sized acquirer at deal announcement.
We further show that acquirer returns are persistent
over time. Acquirers in the top performance quintile
continue to make better acquisitions than acquirers
from the bottom performance quintile at least up to five
years down the road. We find that persistence in acquirer
returns is concentrated mainly in the best performers.
There is a strong positive dependence of future returns on
past returns at the 80th percentile of the return distribu-
tion, but not at the mean. Importantly, persistence in
acquirer returns is unexplained by the usual characteristics
shaping these returns, as we continue to find persistence2 For example, “Cisco defies the odds with mergers that work,” The
Wall Street Journal, 1 March 2000; “With his magic touch, Buffett may be
irreplaceable for Berkshire,” The New York Times, 21 May 2013; “Listen. It's
GE's secret for a successful marriage,” The Guardian, 2 September 2007;
“Diageo’s new boss could use a drink,” The Wall Street Journal, 7
May 2013.in the component of acquirer returns that is orthogonal to
the known determinants.
Naturally, we are interested in the economic forces
behind the fixed effects/persistence in acquirer returns.
Several plausible candidates emerge. First, these effects
could be attributable to particular CEOs, or some other
slow-moving attributes of the broader top management
team. However, we show that acquirer returns continue to
be persistent even when the CEO changes. We probe
further into the “managerial” explanation and attempt to
explain the acquirer fixed effect using the attributes of the
top management team found to be important by the
management science literature. We find that the inclusion
of these variables does not improve the explanatory power
of the acquirer returns model, and does not detract from
the economic or statistical significance of the fixed effects.
Persistence could also be generated by sticking to the
“right” advisors; however, we verify that the firm fixed
effect is distinct from (and much larger than) the advisor
fixed effect. Finally, we show that industry affiliation,
which is subsumed by firm fixed effects, explains little of
the variation in the estimated fixed effects, further reinfor-
cing the idea that the sources of superior takeover perfor-
mance are to be found within the firm and not its
environment.
It appears that some firms are extraordinary acquirers
irrespective of the leadership at the top and the particular
deal structures they choose. We discuss several qualitative
factors that could be responsible for the observed firm
fixed effect and persistence in acquirer returns that are not
readily amenable to testing in a large sample study. The
first group of explanations revolves around organizational
knowledge/skill in deal-making. Such knowledge can
reside with in-house M&A/corporate development teams
charged with screening deals, performing due diligence,
and undertaking most of the analysis behind acquisition
decisions. It can also stem from the particular processes
followed by acquiring firms in terms of post-merger
integration. The second possibility is that persistent acqui-
sition gains reflect some unique, bidder-specific synergies,
for example, stemming from the nature of the firm's assets
or its position in the production process that are particu-
larly well-suited for acquisitions. Finally, persistence could
also be generated endogenously with prior successes
breeding further success. For instance, it could be the case
that making a good deal (even if by luck) positions the firm
for better performance in subsequent deals, thereby creat-
ing path-dependence in acquisition success.
Our paper is related to several strands of literature.
Most notably, it is related to the growing “fixed effects”
literature, but the distinguishing feature of our work is
that we focus on the firm-specific heterogeneity in the
quality rather than the quantity of a particular corporate
policy. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) pioneered this line of
research by showing that manager fixed effects explain
various corporate policies ranging from financing to pay-
out.3 Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) show that3 More recently, Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2013) question whether
the manager-specific effects can be interpreted as causal, and also raise a
A. Golubov et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 116 (2015) 314–330316capital structures are to a large extent explained by time-
invariant firm-specific attributes, but DeAngelo and Roll
(2015) demonstrate that capital structures are much less
stable over longer periods of time and that firm-decade
interactions explain leverage much better than firm effects
alone. Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012) find that manager-firm
fixed effects explain a significant portion of the variation in
managerial compensation. In the M&A setting, Bao and
Edmans (2011) show that a significant advisor fixed effect
in acquirer gains exists, and Kaplan and Schoar (2005) find
private equity house returns to be persistent.
Our study is also related to the strand of the literature
that attempts to establish whether “managers matter” in
corporate decisions and performance. Chang, Dasgupta, and
Hilary (2010) provide evidence consistent with managerial
effects explaining corporate performance. Kaplan, Sensoy,
and Strömberg (2009) study the evolution of firms from
early-stage to initial public offerings (IPOs) and conclude that
investors bet on the business (the horse) rather than the
management (the jockey). In contrast, Gompers, Kovner,
Lerner, and Scharfstein (2010) find persistence in the success
of serial entrepreneurs across their ventures. In the M&A
context, Custódio and Metzger (2013) show that acquiring
firm CEO’s expertise in the target industry leads to better
performance in diversifying acquisitions.
Finally, our paper is related to the M&A literature attempt-
ing to understand the distribution of acquirer returns. Notable
examples are Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) and
Fich, Nguyen, and Officer (2013), who examine large M&A
losses and gains, respectively. Both papers conclude that
episodes of extreme value creation/destruction are one-off
aberrations. We contribute to this literature by exploring the
fixed effects/persistence in acquirer returns more broadly, and
our results suggest that takeover gains are characterized by
significant firm-level persistence. Our findings also imply that,
despite a large literature on acquirer returns, we still appear to
be missing a major part of the puzzle, and that the elusive
driver of takeover gains is likely to be found within, rather
than outside, the firm. We discuss additional implications of
our results for this literature and make suggestions for further
research.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents our data and establishes a highly
significant firm fixed effect in acquirer returns. Section 3
confirms the persistence of acquirer returns over time. We
examine the sources behind the acquirer fixed effect in
Section 4. Section 5 discusses the key results and their
implications. Finally, we close in Section 6 with some
concluding remarks and suggestions for further study.
2. Sample and preliminary results
2.1. Sample selection
The M&A data are sourced from the Thomson Financial
SDC US M&A database over the period from January 1,(footnote continued)
methodological issue regarding the use of the standard F-tests in
assessing the joint significance of the estimated fixed effects. We address
this issue below.1990 to December 31, 2011. We follow Fuller, Netter, and
Stegemoller (2002) and Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) and
impose the following restrictions:1.uns
we
remThe bidder must be a US publicly listed company, and the
target must be a US public, private, or subsidiary firm.2. The acquisition must be completed.43. The acquirer must own less than 50% of the target stock
before the acquisition and achieve 100% after.4. The transaction must be at least 1% of the acquirer's
market capitalization 11 days before the announcement
and also exceed $1 million.5. The bidder's stock price data for 300 trading days prior
to the announcement are available from Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and accounting data
for the year-end immediately prior to the announce-
ment are available from Compustat.6. Multiple deals announced by the same firm on the
same day are excluded.
These requirements result in a sample of 12,491 trans-
actions involving 4,128 unique firms. We use the standard
event study methodology to compute the cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) of the sample acquirers over
the event window (2, þ2) around the announcement
date.5 The CARs are measured as returns in excess of those
predicted by the market model with a benchmark being
the CRSP value-weighted index and parameters estimated
over a period from 300 to 91 days prior to the announce-
ment. In the empirical tests that follow we work with
three samples. The first sample consists of all deals and
firms identified above (full sample hereafter). The other
two samples comprise only acquirers having conducted
multiple acquisitions to enable us to test persistence in
returns. Our first subsample definition follows Fuller,
Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) and requires at least five
deals to be completed by the same acquirer within a three-
year period (frequent acquirers hereafter). This definition
reduces our sample quite dramatically and leaves us with
2,611 deals made by 333 unique acquirers. As an inter-
mediate sample, we also define “occasional acquirers” as
those which complete at least two deals in any three-year
period (occasional acquirers hereafter). Under this defini-
tion we obtain 9,373 deals conducted by 2,219 unique
acquirers.
Samples similar to ours have been extensively used in
previous studies, so we refrain from presenting elaborate
descriptive statistics but verify that they are in line with
prior studies such as Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007),
Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012), and Harford,
Humphery-Jenner, and Powell (2012). However, one note-
worthy observation emerges. Restricting the sample to
acquirers having completed at least two acquisitions in a
three-year period (occasional acquirers) reduces the sam-
ple by less than 25%, from 12,491 to 9,373 deals. That is,4 We obtained qualitatively similar results when including
uccessful bids.
5 We also used CARs over event windows (1, þ1) and (5, þ5), as
ll as market-adjusted returns instead of the market model. All results
ain unchanged.
Table 1
Benchmark OLS regressions of acquirer CARs.
This table presents the results of OLS regressions of acquirer CARs on
acquirer and deal characteristics for the full sample as well as for
occasional and frequent acquirer subsamples. The full sample includes
all domestic M&A transactions completed during the period 1990–2011
from the Thomson Financial SDC M&A Database. Occasional acquirers are
defined as those having completed two or more deals over a three-year
window. Frequent acquirers are defined as those having completed at
least five deals over a three-year window, consistent with Fuller, Netter,
and Stegemoller (2002). The dependent variable in all the specifications
is the cumulative abnormal returns of the acquiring firm stock over the
event window (2, þ2) surrounding the announcement date. The return
is based on the market model with the benchmark being the CRSP value-
weighted index. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for hetero-
skedasticity. Symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively. The variables are defined in the Appendix.
Full sample Occasional
acquirers
Frequent
acquirers
Intercept 0.0321nnn 0.0162 0.0312nn
(2.9414) (1.3952) (2.2909)
Ln (acquirer size) 0.0045nnn 0.0027nnn 0.0037nnn
(5.4960) (3.3855) (3.0030)
Tobin's Q 0.0022nnn 0.0021nn 0.0000
(2.9659) (2.5763) (0.0333)
Run-up 0.0129nnn 0.0104nnn 0.0024
(4.5124) (3.1982) (0.4417)
Free cash flow 0.0124 0.0098 0.0083
(1.3311) (0.9139) (0.4399)
Leverage 0.0169nn 0.0032 0.0085
(2.5231) (0.4352) (0.6784)
Sigma 0.3500nn 0.3946nnn 0.0395
(2.3062) (2.5953) (0.1909)
Relative size 0.0024 0.0159nnn 0.0088nnn
(1.5487) (4.4645) (2.8047)
Relatedness 0.0003 0.0009 0.0048
(0.1604) (0.4496) (1.2725)
Tender offer 0.0020 0.0022 0.0064
(0.3923) (0.3626) (0.6003)
Hostile 0.0071 0.0148 0.0228
(0.5915) (1.2586) (0.9214)
PublicAll-cash 0.0028 0.0081nn 0.0128n
(0.7554) (2.0786) (1.8694)
Public Stock 0.0324nnn 0.0370nnn 0.0283nnn
(12.2678) (12.5716) (5.8496)
PrivateAll-cash 0.0041 0.0026 0.0011
(1.5197) (0.8693) (0.2217)
Private Stock 0.0007 0.0002 0.0011
(0.2586) (0.0761) (0.2089)
SubsidiaryAll-cash 0.0069nnn 0.0055n 0.0012
(2.6064) (1.8546) (0.2149)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
N 12,491 9,373 2,611
R2 (Adj. R2) 0.057 (0.055) 0.064 (0.060) 0.050 (0.036)
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and there is virtually no such thing as a one-off acquirer
in a typical M&A sample found in most papers. The
implication of this is two-fold. First, this structure of the
data lends them well to the fixed effects analysis that we
undertake below. Second, it suggests that M&A studies
employing long-run abnormal stock returns or operat-
ing performance improvements (typically measured over
three years following the deal) stand little chance of
attributing the results to a particular deal (or dealcharacteristic) unless they exclude all frequent acquirers,
which leaves only a small and, most likely, selected and
unrepresentative sample.
2.2. First results
The first part of our empirical analysis is to a large
extent modeled along the work of Bao and Edmans (2011)
who examine investment bank fixed effects in M&A
returns. We begin with a cross-sectional regression of
acquirer CARs for the three samples to serve as our
benchmark specification. We employ an extensive list of
explanatory variables found in most recent and influential
acquirer returns studies. Specifically, we follow Masulis,
Wang, and Xie (2007), Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos
(2012), and Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell (2012)
and control for acquirer size, Tobin's Q, stock price run-up,
idiosyncratic stock return volatility (sigma), free cash flow,
and leverage. We also include deal-specific controls,
namely, relative size, industry relatedness of the target,
tender offer and hostile dummies, and a set of interactions
between target listing status and the method of payment.
We report our first results in Table 1. All variables are
defined in the Appendix.
Most of the estimated coefficients are of the expected
signs and consistent with prior studies although not
always statistically significant. The most significant vari-
ables across all the three regressions are acquirer size and
the interaction term of public targets and stock payment,
which are both negatively associated with acquirer CARs.
Tobin's Q and stock price run-up are consistently negative
but significant only in the full and the occasional acquirer
samples. The interaction term between public target and
all cash deals is negatively associated with CARs even
though it is significant in the serial acquirer subsamples
only. Further we find a positive effect of sigma and relative
size across all the three models although not always
significant.
Most importantly, the R2 (adjusted R2) of these regres-
sions are very modest, but comparable to those in prior
studies (e.g., Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004;
Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007; Harford, Humphery-Jenner,
and Powell, 2012). All of the variables combined explain only
5–6% of the variation in acquirer returns. In short, a com-
prehensive regression model fails to capture the variation in
acquirer returns in any major way. We now compare these
results to a simple fixed effects model reported in Table 2.
We first focus our discussion on Panel A which employs
the full sample, and then comment on the results for the
occasional and frequent acquirer subsamples. Similar to
Bertrand and Schoar (2003), we report F-statistics for test
of the joint significance of the different sets of acquirer
fixed effects for each of the three samples. Strikingly, a
simple model with an acquirer fixed effect reported in the
first row produces an R2 (adjusted R2) of 46% (19.4%). The
fixed effects are highly jointly significant as evidenced
by the F-statistic. Moving from the first row to the fourth,
we first add the year fixed effects, followed by deal char-
acteristics, and then by time-varying firm-level control
variables to the basic fixed effects model. We find that the
inclusion of these additional variables contributes only
Table 2
Acquirer fixed effects.
This table reports the joint significance of acquirer fixed effects (FE) in the regression model of acquirer CARs for the full sample (Panel A) and for
occasional and frequent acquirer subsamples (Panels B and C, respectively). The full sample includes all domestic M&A transactions completed during the
period 1990–2011 from the Thomson Financial SDC M&A Database. Occasional acquirers are defined as those having completed two or more deals over a
three-year window. Frequent acquirers are defined as those having completed at least five deals over a three-year window, consistent with Fuller, Netter,
and Stegemoller (2002). Acquirer CARs are regressed on acquirer fixed effects and the control variables specified in rows 1–4. Deal characteristics include
relative size, relatedness, tender and hostile indicators, and full set of target listing status/payment method interactions. Acquirer characteristics include
the natural logarithm of acquirer size, Tobin’s Q, free cash flow, leverage, run-up, and sigma. F-statistics for the joint significance of acquirer fixed effects are
reported, along with their corresponding p-values and the number of firms (in parentheses). The R2 and the adjusted R2 of the models are also shown.
Symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The variables are defined in the Appendix.
Row Controls Acquirer FE F-test N R2 Adj. R2
Panel A: Full sample
(1) None 1.728nnn (0.000,4128) 12,491 0.460 0.194
(2) Year FE 1.729nnn (0.000,4128) 12,491 0.464 0.197
(3) Deal chars., year FE 1.725nnn (0.000,4128) 12,491 0.478 0.217
(4) Acquirer and deal chars., year FE 1.692nnn (0.000,4128) 12,491 0.487 0.231
Panel B: Occasional acquirers
(1) None 1.368nnn (0.000,2219) 9373 0.298 0.080
(2) Year FE 1.363nnn (0.000,2219) 9373 0.302 0.083
(3) Deal chars., year FE 1.272nnn (0.000,2219) 9373 0.319 0.104
(4) Acquirer and deal chars., year FE 1.287nnn (0.000,2219) 9373 0.332 0.120
Panel C: Frequent acquirers
(1) None 1.211nnn (0.009,333) 2611 0.150 0.026
(2) Year FE 1.233nnn (0.005,333) 2611 0.165 0.035
(3) Deal chars., year FE 1.101 (0.116,333) 2611 0.178 0.046
(4) Acquirer and deal chars., year FE 1.261nnn (0.002,333) 2611 0.199 0.068
6 Mean (median) acquirer market capitalization is $3,067 million
($463 million).
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Specifically, the R2 (adjusted R2) increases by only 2.7%
(3.7%) as we move from the first row to the fourth.
Moreover, the acquirer fixed effects remain highly statis-
tically significant: the F-tests in all cases are significant at
the 1% level leading us to reject the null hypothesis of no
significant joint effects.
It should be noted at this stage that there are some
instances of a single observation per firm in the full sample,
so the explanatory power as indicated by R2 figures above is
overstated. We therefore replicate the fixed effect tests for
the occasional and frequent acquirer subsamples and report
the results in Panels B and C. In these subsamples each
acquirer is found strictly more than once and, hence, the
individual firm fixed effect coefficients—which we examine
later—should be more precisely estimated. In all cases we
find that the firm fixed effects are highly statistically sig-
nificant (at the 1% level) with the only exception of model (3)
in the frequent acquirers subsample. The R2 (adjusted R2) of
the acquirer fixed effect models in the first rows of Panel B
and C are 29.8% (8.0%) and 15.0% (2.6%), respectively. Moving
from the first to the fourth row by adding year fixed effects,
deal and acquirer characteristics increases the R2 (adjusted
R2) by 3.4% (4.0%) and 4.9% (4.2%), respectively. As expected,
the explanatory power of these models is lower due to their
lower saturation with firm dummies (more data points per
firm). That is, in Panel A, the ratio of unique firms to total
number of acquisitions is 0.33, going down to 0.24 in Panel B,
and further declining to 0.13 in Panel C, as we require each
firm to have made more and more acquisitions. In other
words, there is less firm heterogeneity to be picked up by the
fixed effects in the more limited samples. However, even the
most conservative adjusted R2 figures (i.e., Panel C) are
almost as high as those in our benchmark regression inTable 1. Thus, fixed effects alone explain almost as much or
even more (depending on the sample) of the variation in
acquirer returns than many of the important variables
identified by prior literature combined.
So far we have established the statistical significance of
acquirer fixed effects and to reinforce the substance of
these results, we evaluate the economic magnitude of the
fixed effects. In Table 3 we report the interquartile ranges
of the estimated fixed effects for the three samples and
four specifications ranging from fixed effects only to year
fixed effects and a full set of deal and acquirer character-
istics in that order.
As reported in Panel A, the interquartile range of the
returns for the full sample is between 6.12% and 7.83%. For
comparison, the interquartile range of the underlying depen-
dent variable, acquirer CAR, is 7.58%. Note also that the model
in row 4 includes a full set of controls, so that the estimated
acquirer fixed effects do not reflect deal-specific features and
time-varying, firm-specific characteristics. Our results show
that acquirers are either extraordinarily good or bad irrespec-
tive of the deal structures they choose. Moreover, there is
a wide gap in returns between very good and very bad
acquirers. With the most conservative and rounded-down
estimate of the interquartile range of 6%, moving from the
25th percentile to the 75th percentile results in a shareholder
value gain of about $184 million ($28 million) at deal
announcement for a mean-(median)-sized acquirer, which
is highly economically important.6
While the interquartile range of acquirer fixed effects in
the full sample should be interpreted with caution as the
Table 3
Distribution of acquirer fixed effects.
Panel A describes the distribution of the estimated acquirer fixed effects. Panel A presents the standard deviation, the 25th and 75th percentiles, the
interquartile range, skewness, mean, and median of the estimated fixed effects in the full sample. Panels B and C repeat the same statistics for the
occasional acquirers and frequent acquirers samples, respectively. The full sample includes all domestic M&A transactions completed during the period
1990–2011 from the Thomson Financial SDC M&A Database. Occasional acquirers are defined as those having completed two or more deals over a three-
year window. Frequent acquirers are defined as those having completed at least five deals over a three-year window, consistent with Fuller, Netter, and
Stegemoller (2002). Symbols ***, **, and * indicate that the mean/median fixed effect is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. The variables are defined in the Appendix.
Panel A: Full sample
Standard deviation 25th 75th Interquartile range Skewness Mean Median
(1) 9.50% 3.33% 2.98% 6.31% 5.06 0.45%nnn 0.48%nnn
(2) 9.50% 3.30% 2.91% 6.21% 5.06 0.44%nnn 0.53%nnn
(3) 11.98% 3.28% 2.84% 6.12% 13.59 0.12% 0.41%nnn
(4) 10.86% 4.70% 3.13% 7.83% 5.73 0.68%nnn 0.58%nnn
Panel B: Occasional acquirers
Standard deviation 25th 75th Interquartile range Skewness Mean Median
(1) 6.27% 2.61% 2.57% 5.17% 2.34 0.32%nn 0.29%
(2) 6.24% 2.61% 2.53% 5.14% 2.36 0.33%nn 0.28%
(3) 6.02% 2.54% 2.44% 4.98% 2.28 0.18% 0.26%n
(4) 6.46% 3.80% 3.12% 6.92% 1.01 0.40%nnn 0.24%nnn
Panel C: Frequent acquirers
Standard deviation 25th 75th Interquartile range Skewness Mean Median
(1) 3.77% 1.96% 1.76% 3.73% 1.62 0.20% 0.36%
(2) 3.80% 2.06% 1.83% 3.89% 1.56 0.19% 0.35%
(3) 3.48% 1.92% 1.77% 3.68% 1.08 0.08% 0.32%
(4) 5.33% 3.60% 2.94% 6.53% 0.11 0.23% 0.08%
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firm, these magnitudes are confirmed in the occasional and
frequent acquirer subsamples, where this is not a concern
(Panels B and C, respectively). Depending on the set of
controls, the interquartile range is between 4.98% and
6.92% for the occasional acquirer subsample, and between
3.68% and 6.53% for the frequent acquirer subsample. When
year fixed effects, deal-, and time-varying firm-specific cha-
racteristics are included in row 4, the difference between the
75th and 25th percentiles is 6.92% and 6.53% for the
occasional acquirers and frequent acquirers, respectively.
We also note that the distribution of the estimated
fixed effects is somewhat positively skewed (except for
models (3) and (4) in the full sample), and all medians are
negative, albeit not always statistically significant, suggest-
ing that there are slightly more firms with negative firm-
specific components in acquirer returns.7 The results are reported in Table A.1 in the Internet Appendix.2.3. Robustness of the acquirer fixed effect
Recently, Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2013) criticize the
use of standard F-test procedures in establishing the joint
significance of the estimated fixed effects. Replicating the
analysis of Bertrand and Schoar (2003), they show that
after scrambling the data and randomly assigning CEOs to
firms—thereby destroying any CEO effect in the data—the
standard F-tests and the associated p-values are hardly
affected. This indicates a strong fixed effect even when
none is present in the data by construction, casting doubt
on the validity of inferences based on standard F-tests inthis context. We take these concerns seriously and per-
form a similar data scrambling exercise to establish
robustness of our main result.
Specifically, we follow Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2013)
and break the structure of the data by randomly allocating
deals to firms. We perform such Monte Carlo permutations
of the data one thousand times, each time re-estimating the
fixed effects models in Table 2 and recording the F-test on
the joint significance of the firm fixed effect. If the firm-
specific effect in acquirer returns is genuine, we would
expect it to disappear when the deals are randomly
allocated to firms. In all cases we find that the median
F-test from the one thousand random permutations of the
data loses statistical significance and does not reject the
null of no significant firm-specific effects in acquirer
returns.7 This is relieving, as no firm effect is present in
the data following the permutations. It turns out that, in our
context, the standard F-test performs well, identifying a
significant fixed effect when it appears to be present and
failing to identify one when there is none by construction.
Our later tests of the persistence in acquirer returns further
alleviate the concerns that the fixed effect is spurious.
2.4. Time-invariant versus time-varying heterogeneity in
acquirer returns
While the early capital structure literature has
established significant firm fixed effects/persistence in
Table 4
Persistence of acquirer returns.
This table presents univariate tests of persistence in acquirer returns for occasional and frequent acquirers. The full sample includes all domestic M&A
transactions completed during the period 1990–2011 from the Thomson Financial SDC M&A Database. Occasional acquirers are defined as those having
completed two or more deals over a three-year window. Frequent acquirers are defined as those having completed at least five deals over a three-year
window, consistent with Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002). In Panel A serial acquirers are sorted into quintiles based on their average CARs (denoted
RET) over the last three calendar years. Q1 and Q5 represent serial acquirers with the lowest and highest past RET, respectively. The average CARs to
acquisitions made by all the acquirers in Q1 and Q5 over the next k calendar years are then computed, where k¼(1, 2, 3, 4, 5) and denoted as future RET.
Panel B repeats the analysis where residual CARs obtained from regressions estimated in Table 1 are used to sort acquirers into performance quintiles (past
RETRES) and to measure subsequent performance (future RETRES). The t-statistics for the differences in means between Q5 and Q1 are reported in
parentheses. Symbols ***,**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The variables are defined in the Appendix.
Panel A: Persistence in CARs
Future RET measured over
Quintiles measured over 3 yr RET 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years
Occasional acquirers
Q1 0.41% 0.17% 0.17% 0.15% 0.15%
Q5 0.72% 0.90% 0.91% 1.16% 1.22%
Q5–Q1 0.31% 1.07% 1.08% 1.31% 1.37%
(0.63) (2.73nnn) (3.09nnn) (4.17nnn) (4.52nnn)
Frequent acquirers
Q1 0.40% 0.01% 0.04% 0.00% 0.02%
Q5 0.43% 0.50% 0.69% 0.98% 1.06%
Q5–Q1 0.03% 0.51% 0.65% 0.98% 1.07%
(0.06) (1.20) (1.66n) (3.16nnn) (3.63nnn)
Panel B: Persistence in residual CARs
Future RETRES measured over
Quintiles measured over 3yr RETRES 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years
Occasional acquirers
Q1 0.39% 1.00% 0.69% 0.73% 0.80%
Q5 0.52% 0.25% 0.13% 0.36% 0.54%
Q5–Q1 0.91% 1.25% 0.82% 1.09% 1.34%
(1.58) (2.69nnn) (1.95n) (2.93nnn) (3.71nnn)
Frequent acquirers
Q1 0.14% 0.59% 0.59% 0.46% 0.44%
Q5 0.19% 0.15% 0.25% 0.20% 0.19%
Q5–Q1 0.04% 0.44% 0.34% 0.26% 0.26%
(0.06) (0.69) (0.56) (0.43) (0.43)
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(2015) suggests that capital structures are much less
stable than previously thought. They show that the
similarity between leverage cross-sections is short-lived,
with current relative leverage positions being poor pre-
dictors of future relative leverage positions five to ten
years later. They also demonstrate that interactions of
time and firm effects do a better job at explaining
leverage than do firm effects alone.
Given those results, a natural question that arises is
whether the firm-specific heterogeneity in acquirer
returns we document is really time-invariant. Unfortu-
nately, a dedicated analysis of this issue is complicated by
two nuances of the takeover data. First, we do not have a
long panel of takeover data with precise announcement
dates. Given the evidence in DeAngelo and Roll (2015), a
shorter panel means that we could be overstating the
stability of the firm fixed effect. Second, unlike yearly
leverage observations, takeover announcements are not
evenly spaced in time, and, in most cases, do not occur
every year for a given firm; other firms, in contrast, make
several acquisitions per year.With these limitations in mind, we rerun our models
with firm-period interactions, where periods are defined
as three (divides the sample roughly in seven), 5.5 (divides
the sample in four), and 11 years (divides the sample in
two). Results reported in the Internet Appendix (Table A.2)
reveal that the additional explanatory power of such
models as captured by the adjusted R2 is economically
modest, and in many cases, the F-test for the differences
between the simple firm fixed effect and firm-period fixed
effects models fails to reject the null of no additional
explanatory power. These results suggest that firm-specific
heterogeneity in acquirer returns is more fixed than time-
varying.
3. Persistence of acquirer returns
The presence of a strong acquirer fixed effect implies
that acquirer returns are persistent over time. In this
section we perform formal tests of persistence in acquirer
returns. Persistence tests explicitly require multiple acqui-
sitions by all acquirers over time and as a consequence we
restrict this part of the analysis to the occasional and
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similar to Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) for stocks, Carhart
(1997) for mutual funds, and Bao and Edmans (2011) for
investment bank advisors. We sort serial acquirers into
quintiles based on their average CAR over the last three-
year period (RET) consistent with our definitions. For each
quintile, we compute the average RET to the future
acquisitions made by all acquirers within that quintile
over the next k calendar years, where k¼(1, 2, 3, 4, 5). We
then test for the difference in means between the top (Q5)
and the bottom (Q1) quintiles.
Table 4, Panel A reports persistence in raw CARs and
the results are consistent across the two subsamples. The
differences in average CARs between Q5 and Q1 are
positive and statistically significant from k¼2 to k¼5 for
occasional acquirers, and from k¼3 to k¼5 for frequent
acquirers. The lack of significant results for k¼1 can be
attributed to the small number of deals that are conducted
within one year.
At this stage, it is still possible that persistence in
acquirer returns is not really firm-specific but simply
driven by firms routinely choosing (consciously or uncon-
sciously) the types of acquisitions that are known to have
superior performance (for example, private firm acquisi-
tions, cash payment in public firm takeovers, etc.). While
this strategy does benefit acquirer's shareholders, we are
interested whether there is an effect beyond persistence in
deal types (i.e., a genuine firm effect). We therefore repeat
the persistence tests using residual CARs (RETRES)—
defined as the average residual CAR obtained from the
regressions in Table 1—and report the results in Panel B.
This test ensures that the persistence in raw acquirer
returns is not driven by the persistence in firm- or deal-
specific characteristics, because RETRES is orthogonal to
them by construction. There is persistence in residual CARs
in the occasional acquirer sample but not in the frequent
acquirer sample. This is consistent with firm effects having
relatively less explanatory power than the usual controls
in this subsample (recall Table 2). We will revisit this in the
regression analysis that follows.8
It is remarkable to observe that the returns to the lower
quintiles in each of the significant results cells are negative
whereas they are positive for the upper quintile. These
results provide additional evidence that certain acquirers
are indeed extraordinary as they persistently generate
positive average returns from their acquisitions.98 The persistence tests above for both RET and RETRES are based on
equally weighted average acquirer returns. Such persistence could be
misleading if an acquirer is good at conducting relatively small deals, but
destroys a lot of value when it comes to large acquisitions. To rule the
possibility of relatively small deals driving the averages out, we rerun the
persistence tests using transaction value-weighted returns, where the
weights are the ratios of deal value to the sum of transaction values of
that acquirer over the period in which the performance is measured. The
results (reported in Table A.3 of the Internet Appendix) are largely
consistent with those based on equally weighted returns.
9 An interesting question is why the bad acquirers continue to make
acquisitions. This could be due to governance failures (e.g., weak board
oversight, managerial entrenchment) or “honest” mistakes such as
overconfidence.Next we perform multivariate versions of the persis-
tence tests. Multivariate regressions allow us to use all
firms and not just those in the top and bottom quintiles
and thus establish whether the persistence is character-
istic of all acquirers or just those at the extremes. Panel A
of Table 5 reports the results of a simple ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression of future returns (measured over
one, two, three, four and five years) on past returns
(measured over three years consistent with our defini-
tions). Interestingly, this specification reveals no signifi-
cant association between future and past returns of the
same acquirer, apart from the last two columns where the
future return is measured over four and five years. This
suggests that the bulk of the persistence in returns as
shown in Table 4 is, indeed, concentrated at the extremes,
and there is little-to-no dependence of future returns on
past returns on average.
Motivated by the significant univariate differences
between the best and the worst acquirers and the lack of
a strong significant association between future and past
returns on average, we perform quantile regression analy-
sis to further explore the persistence phenomenon.10 We
model the 20th and the 80th percentiles of the future
returns distribution as a function of past returns of the
same acquirer and report the results in Panels B and C of
Table 5. The 20th and 80th percentiles are approximately
consistent with the quintile tests. 11
The results reported in Panel B show that past return is
unable to explain future returns in the quantile regressions
estimated at the 20th percentile point. Past RET is consis-
tently insignificant in all the estimated models. However,
Panel C reveals a very different and fascinating picture. We
find a strong positive association between the past and
future returns at the 80th percentile point of the future
returns distribution. The results are highly robust across
both occasional and frequent acquirer samples and across
the time horizons over which future returns are measured:
all coefficients are significant at the 1% level, except for k¼3
and k¼5 in the frequent acquirer sample which are
significant at the 5% level. The intercepts are positive and
significant at the top (the 80th percentile) and negative and
significant at the bottom (the 20th percentile) of the
distribution, consistent with our setup. These results con-
tinue to hold when residual returns (RETRES) instead of the
raw returns are used in the regression tests of persistence
(reported in Table A.4 in the Internet Appendix).4. What explains the ﬁxed effect?
Having established a significant acquirer fixed effect
and its flip side, persistence in acquirer returns, we turn10 Whereas an OLS regression estimates the conditional mean func-
tion, quantile regressions allow for the estimation of the conditional nth
percentile of the distribution as a function of the explanatory variable(s).
The coefficients in a quantile regression are interpreted as the effect of a
one-unit change in the explanatory variable on the nth percentile of the
dependent variable.
11 We also experiment with alternative percentile points. The 25th
and 75th percentiles produce equally strong results, but the 10th and 90th
percentiles do not.
Table 5
Regression analysis of persistence in acquirer returns.
This table presents the results of OLS and quantile regressions of future returns on past returns for occasional and frequent acquirers. The full sample
includes all domestic M&A transactions completed during the period 1990–2011 from the Thomson Financial SDC M&A Database. Occasional acquirers are
defined as those having completed two or more deals over a three-year window. Frequent acquirers are defined as those having completed at least five
deals over a three-year window, consistent with Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002). Panels A, B, and C estimate the conditional mean (OLS), 20th
percentile, and 80th percentile of the future returns distribution, respectively. The dependent variable is RET measured as the average CAR to all the
acquisitions made by an acquirer over the next k calendar years, where k¼(1, 2, 3, 4, 5). The explanatory variable ‘Past RET’ is the average CAR to all
acquisitions over the last three calendar years. For the OLS regressions the t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for clustering by acquirer. Symbols ***, **,
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The variables are defined in the Appendix.
Panel A: OLS regressions
Future RET measured over
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years
Occasional acquirers
Intercept 0.0012 0.0005 0.0008 0.001 0.0014
(0.6569) (0.3582) 0.5865 0.7336 1.0446
Past RET 0.0306 0.0452 0.0406 0.0532nn 0.0536nn
(0.6638) (1.2655) (1.4037) (2.4065) (2.5407)
N 3,209 4,215 4,687 4,854 4,975
R2 (Adj. R2) 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.004 (0.004) 0.005 (0.004)
Frequent acquirers
Intercept 0.0021 0.0019 0.0011 0.0012 0.0007
(0.8880) (0.9560) (0.5897) (0.6514) (0.3669)
Past RET 0.0275 0.0023 0.0018 0.037 0.0454
(0.2920) (0.0285) (0.0288) (0.9621) (1.2731)
N 2,056 2,371 2,491 2,542 2,585
R2 (Adj. R2) 0.001 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.002 (0.002) 0.004 (0.003)
Panel B: 20th percentile
Future RET measured over
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years
Occasional acquirers
Intercept 0.0350nnn 0.0326nnn 0.0304nnn 0.0285nnn 0.0275nnn
(23.2226) (25.8673) (37.6295) (33.7731) (37.2091)
Past RET 0.0131 0.0091 0.0048 0.0058 0.0146
(0.6156) (0.5224) (0.4565) (0.4862) (1.4017)
N 3,209 4,215 4,687 4,854 4,975
Pseudo R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Frequent acquirers
Intercept 0.0310nnn 0.0287nnn 0.0274nnn 0.0266nnn 0.0262nnn
(19.3509) (28.6226) (29.7629) (37.3366) (47.3677)
Past RET 0.0129 0.0034 0.0015 0.0094 0.0138
(0.4072) (0.1905) (0.1045) (0.8421) (1.6089)
N 2,056 2,371 2,491 2,542 2,585
Pseudo R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel C: 80th percentile
Future RET measured over
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5years
Occasional acquirers
Intercept 0.0327nnn 0.0324nnn 0.0322nnn 0.0305nnn 0.0305nnn
(21.0476) (23.0026) (29.5242) (33.0408) (33.8355)
Past RET 0.0862nnn 0.1027nnn 0.0903nnn 0.0863nnn 0.0862nnn
(3.6178) (4.6792) (5.6280) (6.4125) (6.5128)
N 3,209 4,215 4,687 4,854 4,975
Pseudo R2 0.005 0.008 0.010 0.011 0.010
Frequent acquirers
Intercept 0.0239nnn 0.0238nnn 0.0247nnn 0.0234nnn 0.0227nnn
(14.9072) (18.2690) (18.8849) (18.9128) (17.4635)
Past RET 0.1007nnn 0.0817nnn 0.0619nn 0.0698nnn 0.0681nn
(3.4704) (3.1849) (2.3641) (2.7933) (2.5550)
N 2,056 2,371 2,491 2,542 2,585
Pseudo R2 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.007
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In other words, we are interested in the economic forces
behind the statistical concept of fixed effects/persistence
in returns. In Section 4.1 we test several plausible explana-
tions, namely: (i) the CEO effect, (ii) attributes of the
broader top management team, and (iii) the advisor effect.
In Section 5 we also examine whether the firm effect
stands-in for an industry effect, i.e., whether extraordinary
acquirers simply come from the “right” industries. Finally,
in Section 4.2 we discuss the more qualitative factors such
as organizational knowledge/skill in deal-making, bidder-
specific synergies, and path-dependence arising from
success breeding success.13 Execucomp collects up to nine executives from each company’s
annual proxy statement (Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) form
DEF14A) for a given year, and hence, cannot capture all of the company’s
top managers but for the purpose of our analysis this information is
sufficient. According to the SEC DEF14A filing rules, a company is required4.1. Formal tests
Existing literature stresses the role of CEOs in firm
performance viewing them as the sole executives in
charge of core corporate development activities such as
acquisitions (e.g., Roll, 1986; Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack,
2004; Billett and Qian, 2008; Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll,
2009, 2011, 2013). Since CEO turnover events are rare for
most firms, it is possible that the firm effect is, in fact, the
CEO effect. To disentangle the firm effect from the CEO
effect one needs to estimate a model with both firm and
CEO fixed effects. Naturally, for the CEO fixed effect to be
identified separately one needs to observe a given CEO
conducting deals in at least two different firms. Thus, not
only a sample of CEO moves is required, but these moves
have to be between acquiring firms in our sample. We are
able to identify only 57 deals conducted by CEOs who can
be found in at least two different acquiring firms in our full
sample, with 42 and 14 observations in the occasional and
frequent acquirer samples, respectively. This data limita-
tion precludes any meaningful analysis in this regard. This
is despite our best efforts to supplement the standard CEO
data from Compustat's Execucomp—the usual source of
data on corporate executives—with that from BoardEx
whose coverage is broader.12
However, for the purpose of the persistence tests it is
sufficient to focus on any CEO turnover event, not neces-
sarily moves between acquiring firms. We therefore limit
the sample to (i) acquirers experiencing a CEO turnover,
and (ii) having conducted at least one deal within each of
the three-year periods surrounding the CEO change (given
that data are sparse, we do not require multiple deals to be
conducted in each period). We are able to identify 104
such firms, of which 39 conducted multiple deals both
before and after the turnover. We proceed to measure the
average CAR and average residual CAR to the acquisitions
performed by the firm in the three-year pre-turnover
period (past RET or RETRES) and the three-year post-
turnover period (future RET or RETRES). We then repeat
the persistence regressions of Table 5. If the observed
persistence in acquirer returns is solely attributable to the
CEOs, we would expect to find no persistence in returns12 We would like to thank Cláudia Custódio and Daniel Metzger for
kindly sharing their extended Execucomp-BoardEx CEO data set used in
Custódio and Metzger (2013).for deals conducted by the same firm but different CEOs.
Table 6 reports the results.
Looking at the conditional mean, 20th percentile, and
80th percentile of the future raw return distribution, we
do not find a statistically significant association with past
returns, although the coefficient for the 80th percentile is
positive. Turning to the residual returns, we find a sig-
nificant association between past and future returns at the
80th percentiles, as well as in the OLS regression. The
results based on residual returns ensure that the persis-
tence (or lack thereof) is not driven by likely differences in
deal structures under different CEOs, and hence should be
preferred in the context of CEO turnovers. Overall, despite
the CEO change (and despite the very small sample size)
we continue to find some evidence of acquirer returns
being persistent, and again mainly at the top end of the
acquirer returns distribution. This finding suggests that
persistence in acquirer returns is unlikely to be entirely
attributed to CEOs.
Alternatively, the firm fixed effect could be picking up
other slow-moving attributes of the managerial team. If
this is the case, these variables should be strong predictors
of acquirer returns. In fact, a singular focus on the CEO as
the sole driver of acquisition decisions could be too narrow
as it overlooks the interdependence among key executives
in organizational structures. For instance, practitioners
often emphasize the importance of managerial teams in
making M&A deals a success or a failure. We therefore
probe further into the managerial explanation for the
observed firm fixed effects in acquirer returns by borrow-
ing from the management science literature and identify-
ing a set of variables characterizing the managerial team as
a whole that has been found to affect various corporate
outcomes.
The data on the top management team are extracted
from Compustat's Execucomp database.13 We define the
top management team as executives with a listed title
above the vice-president level reported in Execucomp as
they constitute executives at the senior-most level. This is
consistent with Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) and
Hambrick, Cho, and Chen (1996), among others. We take
into account the dynamics in top management team over
time by measuring all the variables at the end of the most
recent fiscal year prior to the announcement date. We use
several variables to capture different dimensions of the top
management team characteristics across firms.
Our first measure is team size. The numerical strength
of the team reflects the managerial resources available to
the firm for it brings diversity to corporate decision-
making in areas such as opportunity seeking and negotia-
tions. Compared with small-sized teams, for example,to fully disclose information about compensations received by its most
senior executives and directors. The executive officers named in a proxy
statement are the most influential executives in the corporate decision-
making process and should wield the greatest impact on acquisition
strategies.
Table 6
Persistence of acquirer returns in CEO turnover firms.
This table presents the results of OLS and quantile regressions of future returns on past returns for the subset of firms experiencing CEO turnover events
and having made a deal within three years before and after the CEO change. The full sample includes all domestic M&A transactions completed during the
period 1990–2011 from the Thomson Financial SDC M&A Database. The dependent variable “Future RET“ (“Future RETRES“) is the average CAR (residual
CAR) to all the acquisitions made by the acquirer within three years following the CEO turnover. The explanatory variable “Past RET“ (“Past RETRES“) is the
average CAR (residual CAR) to all acquisitions made by the acquirer within three years prior to CEO turnover. For the OLS regressions the t-statistics in
parentheses are adjusted for clustering by acquirer. Symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The variables are
defined in the Appendix.
Dependent: Future RET OLS 20th 80th
Intercept 0.0066 0.0306nnn 0.0237nnn
(1.4514) (3.7932) (3.5583)
Past RET 0.0636 0.0544 0.1522
(1.1331) (0.3875) (1.3126)
N 104 104 104
R2 (Adj. R2) [Pseudo R2] 0.006 (0.003) [0.008] [0.017]
Dependent: Future RETRES OLS 20th 80th
Intercept 0.0054 0.0244nnn 0.0245nnn
(1.1705) (3.7716) (4.2817)
Past RETRES 0.1060nn 0.0671 0.1934n
(2.0533) (0.6050) (1.9712)
N 104 104 104
R2 (Adj. R2) [Pseudo R2] 0.018 (0.008) [0.013] [0.017]
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range of perspectives on a greater number of items, critical
judgments, and alternative solutions for conducting com-
prehensive search and analysis of strategic options
(Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993). Such increased resources
and capabilities can result in high-quality acquisition
decisions and superior performance. Large top teams are,
however, prone to conflicts and cooperation problems that
would otherwise be absent in small groups (Jehn, 1995).
Nevertheless, the complex, non-routine nature of M&As
makes it possible that the benefits of enhanced capabilities
accruing to large-sized teams would outweigh the costs
associated with coordination problems (Haleblian and
Finkelstein, 1993).
Another widely used indicator of top management
team capability is team tenure. Prior evidence suggests
that top team tenure is associated with persistence in
strategic direction (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990).
Higher average tenure can indicate greater cohesion and
shared experiences in strategic decision-making. Consis-
tent with Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005), top team tenure
is calculated as the average number of years top team
members have worked in the acquiring firm.
Long tenure, however, may create increasing rigidity
and complacency in a team's interaction process. It is
therefore critical for long-tenured teams to possess certain
degrees of heterogeneity to offer new information sources
and introduce new perspectives into the decision making.
While disagreements are more likely to be present in
heterogeneous teams, resolving such disagreements
encourages team members to think carefully about the
appropriateness of the proposed strategic solution. This is
likely to initiate extensive investigations necessary for
uncovering errors and producing sound evaluation results
and corporate decisions (Miller, Burke, and Glick, 1998). In
support of this view, prior studies show a positive linkbetween top team heterogeneity and firm performance,
suggesting that cognitive diversity is a valuable resource to
a firm. Hambrick, Cho, and Chen (1996), for example, find
that top management teams with greater tenure hetero-
geneity enjoy higher growth rates in both market share
and profits. We define heterogeneity in team tenure as the
coefficient of variation in team tenure.
The average age of the top management team is used as
an additional proxy for the general experience of the top
team members having worked within and outside the
acquiring firm.
Finally, we consider the effect of a powerful CEO who
can potentially make important corporate decisions on a
stand-alone basis, disregarding other top managers’ views.
This could diminish any efficiency gains from a team, as
team members may feel reluctant to participate, share
information, or report ideas that run counter to the CEO.
Following Finkelstein (1992), Hambrick and D'Aveni
(1992), and Hayward and Hambrick (1997), among others,
CEO power is measured using the pay differential between
the CEO and other top managers, defined as salary plus
bonus in the most recent fiscal year prior to the announce-
ment date scaled by the average salary plus bonus of the
other top management team members.
Our strategy is as follows. We first augment the fixed
effects regression model in row 4 of Table 2 with manage-
rial characteristics and examine whether these variables
are significant determinants of acquirer returns. Results
are reported in Panel A of Table 7. Surprisingly, none of
the managerial characteristics explain acquirer returns in
the full sample. We find, however, that tenure heteroge-
neity and average age are statistically significant in the
frequent acquirers subsample whereas average tenure is
positive and significant in the occasional acquirers sub-
sample. Even though the top management team character-
istics play a role in the occasional and frequent acquirer
Table 7
Top management team characteristics, acquirer CARs, and acquirer fixed effects.
Estimates reported in Panel A are from regressions of acquirer CARs on acquirer top management team characteristics and other controls listed in Table 1
for the full sample as well as for occasional and frequent acquirer subsamples. The full sample includes all domestic M&A transactions completed during
the period 1990–2011 from the Thomson Financial SDC M&A Database. Occasional acquirers are defined as those having completed two or more deals over
a three-year window. Frequent acquirers are defined as those having completed at least five deals over a three-year window, consistent with Fuller, Netter,
and Stegemoller (2002). Only the coefficients on the top management team variables are reported, with the t-statistics in parentheses adjusted for
heteroskedasticity. Panel B reports the joint significance of acquirer fixed effects (FE) in the regression model of acquirer CARs on acquirer fixed effects, year
fixed effects, the deal and acquirer characteristics, and with and without the top management team characteristics. F-statistics for the joint significance of
acquirer fixed effects are reported, along with their corresponding p-values and number of firms (in parentheses). The R2 and the adjusted R2 of the models
are also shown. Panel C reports the distribution of acquirer fixed effects for the full sample as well as for the subsamples of occasional and frequent
acquirers before and after the top management team variables are added. Team size is measured as the number of the acquiring firm's officers with a listed
title above the vice president level in the most recent fiscal year prior to the announcement date. Average tenure represents the average number of years
for which the top management team members have worked in the acquiring firm prior to the announcement date. Tenure heterogeneity is the coefficient
of variation of the top management team members’ tenures. The average age of top management team members is measured at the end of the most recent
fiscal year prior to the announcement date. CEO dominance is calculated as CEO’s salary and bonus divided by the average salary and bonus of other team
members for the most recent fiscal year prior to the announcement date. Symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
The variables are defined in the Appendix.
Panel A: OLS regression of CARs on managerial characteristics
Full sample Occasional Frequent
Team size 0.0014 0.0011 0.0013
(0.9637) (0.6726) (0.3973)
Average tenure 0.0003 0.0005nn 0.0001
(1.6092) (2.0604) (0.2055)
Tenure heterogeneity 0.0057 0.007 0.0120n
(1.4492) (1.5921) (1.8015)
Average age 0.0002 0.0002 0.0020nnn
(0.4707) (0.5961) (2.8067)
CEO dominance 0.0000 0.0001 0.0024
(0.0069) (0.0940) (1.4861)
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes
N 2,188 1,799 576
R2 (Adj. R2) 0.085 (0.068) 0.097 (0.077) 0.122 (0.062)
Panel B: Top management team characteristics and acquirer FE
Without managerial characteristics With managerial characteristics
Acq. FE F-test R2 Adj. R2 Acq. FE F-test R2 Adj. R2 N
(1) Full 1.133nn (0.024,760) 0.432 0.110 1.129nn(0.028,760) 0.433 0.109 2,188
(2) Occasional 1.145nn (0.032,509) 0.380 0.113 1.143nn(0.034,509) 0.383 0.114 1,799
(3) Frequent 1.473nnn(0.005,96) 0.313 0.118 1.324nn(0.033,96) 0.316 0.112 576
Panel C: Distribution of acquirer FE with top management team characteristics
Without managerial characteristics With managerial characteristics
SD 25th 75th Interquar. range SD 25th 75th Interquar. range
(1) Full 5.95% 2.63% 2.75% 5.38% 5.97% 2.83% 2.72% 5.55%
(2) Occasional 5.27% 2.10% 2.83% 4.93% 5.32% 2.39% 2.83% 5.22%
(3) Frequent 4.22% 2.33% 2.67% 5.00% 4.24% 2.79% 2.59% 5.38%
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different samples.
Given that some of the managerial characteristics are
important in some of the regressions, we further examine
their contribution to the explanatory power of the models,
and whether they reduce the statistical and economic
magnitude of the acquirer fixed effects. Results are reported
in Panels B and C of Table 7. Due to different sample
composition, the acquirer fixed effects here are not directly
comparable to those estimated in Table 2. We therefore
compute acquirer fixed effects for the three samples without
managerial characteristics and then repeat the estimation
process by including the top management team variables.We hold the number of observations constant to facilitate
comparisons. Essentially, the R2 (adjusted R2) do not change
when we include the managerial characteristics. Similarly,
the interquartile ranges reported in Panel C for the three
models do not remarkably change with the inclusion of these
variables. In short, we find that the addition of managerial
characteristics variables does not detract from the statistical
and economic significance of the fixed effects, suggesting
that these characteristics are not behind acquirer fixed
effects documented in this paper.
Alternatively, since there is persistence in the perfor-
mance of M&A advisors (Bao and Edmans, 2011), firm-
level persistence could, in principle, be generated by
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unlikely explanation given that acquirers tend to switch
advisors from deal to deal quite frequently. For instance,
Bao and Edmans (2011) report that only 21.4% of deals in
their sample are advised by the same investment bank as
all prior deals of the same acquirer in a five-year period. In
unreported results, we verify that the inclusion of invest-
ment bank fixed effects does not detract from the eco-
nomic and statistical significance of acquirer fixed effects.
We also note that the economic magnitude of the firm-
specific effect, as measured by the interquartile range in
the estimated acquirer fixed effects, is several times larger
than that of the advisor-specific effects documented by
Bao and Edmans (2011).4.2. Potential qualitative factors
Having ruled out several plausible explanations that were
amenable to testing in a large sample study, we now discuss
several qualitative factors that could explain the firm-specific
heterogeneity in acquirer gains. While suggestive in nature,
we believe these could be fruitful avenues of further
research. The first possibility is that there is firm-specific
acquisition skill. This can be due to organizational knowl-
edge and/or particular processes with respect to acquisitions.
It is difficult to pin down the exact source of this expertise,
but we do offer some tentative conclusions based on
anecdotal evidence. One possibility is that such expertise
resides in the internal M&A/corporate development teams,
who are charged with target screening, due diligence, and
analysis underlying the acquisition decisions ultimately
made by the top management. It is well-known that most
large firms, and particularly frequent acquirers, maintain
such in-house M&A teams.14 This explanation implies that
the best performers choose the right targets and/or pay the
right price for them. Alternatively, persistently superior
performance could reflect the market’s expectation of parti-
cularly skillful post-merger integration. Again, anecdotes and
case studies confirm that many frequent acquirers have
developed and routinely follow procedures in this respect
(see, e.g., Ashkenas, DeMonaco, and Francis, 1998). This
explanation implies that the best performers extract the
most value out of the acquired assets.15
The above two explanations imply firm-specific skill in
deal-making. Alternatively, our results could be inter-
preted as evidence of bidder-specific synergies. For
instance, it could be the firm’s position in the production
process or some unique assets that enable it to integrate
and leverage the various acquisitions it makes. The social
networking firm Facebook Inc. (FB) may be a good exam-
ple. FB controls the user base and is, quite literally, a
platform for other applications. Their recent acquisitions of14 For example, “AT&T calls on ‘Deal Team,’” The Wall Street Journal, 14
May 2014; “The secrets of successful acquisitions,” The Wall Street Journal,
22 September 2008; “The M&A forge,” The Wall Street Journal, 16 January
2007; “Learn as you churn,” The Economist, 6 April 2006.
15 Note, however, that our models control for general performance
indicators such as Tobin's Q and cash flows/equity, suggesting that
extraordinary acquirers are not just generally better performing firms.
Similar arguments can be made about the timing of deals.the photo sharing service Instagram and the messaging
service WhatsApp can be thought of as capitalizing on this
position. It seems that FB is in a position to get the most
out of these applications because of its commercial and
technological centrality in the social media business. Smit
and Moraitis (2010) express similar thoughts regarding
Vodafone's acquisition strategy in the early 2000s. Gen-
eralizing from these examples, it is the nature of the firm's
assets/business model that could be particularly well-
suited for acquisitions.
Finally, persistence might not necessarily be evidence
of skill. Rather, prior success could be breeding further
successes. For example, if a firm pulls off a good deal, even
if by pure luck (e.g., makes a low-ball offer which is
accepted), its perceived reputation as a good deal-maker
could help the firm next time around. For instance, the
funding may be provided at more advantageous terms, key
employees are more likely to stay on board, the target
might not resist as much, etc. For instance, Hart and
Holmstrom (2010) analyze Cisco and argue that its
approach to treating the acquired firms and their man-
agers created a reputation of a “well-liked” acquirer which
the target firms did not resist. Similar sentiment is
expressed towards Warren Buffett’s approach to dealing
with the acquired firms’ management, which, together
with its financial muscle, made Berkshire Hathaway a “go-
to” acquirer.16 In addition, the right acquisition can itself
create the platform for future successful acquisitions,
which ties this path-dependence argument back with the
bidder-specific synergies story above. The key insight,
though, is that persistence could be endogenous to prior
successes while the latter may or may not be due to skill.5. Discussion
In this section we discuss our findings in light of the
broader literature and comment on their implications for
the M&A research. The results we document are consistent
with acquirers possessing acquisition skill. Jaffe, Pedersen,
and Voetmann (2013) analyze skill differences in acquisi-
tions by regressing acquirer returns in a given deal on the
return of the same acquirer in its previous deal. They show
that such a positive dependence exists, but only when the
two deals are conducted by the same CEO (though noting
that the latter finding could be due to low power arising
from very few CEO moves in their sample). Our approach is
much more general in that our econometric methodology
allows us to study acquirer fixed effects in all deals by the
same acquirer—be they prior to or even after the deal in
question. A finding of persistent acquirer returns is broadly
consistent with the findings of Kaplan and Schoar (2005)
who document persistence in the returns of private equity
(buyout and venture capital) funds, whose business is
acquiring public and private firms. There also appears to
be persistence in the performance of serial entrepreneurs16 For example, “Going on safari with Warren Buffett,” Wall Street
Journal, 1 March 2011; “In deal hunt, big-game Buffett settles for small
prey,” Wall Street Journal, 8 August 2013.
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and Scharfstein, 2010).
Our results also add to the results of Fuller, Netter, and
Stegemoller (2002), Billett and Qian (2008), and Aktas, de
Bodt, and Roll (2011) who study serial acquirers and show
that, for a given acquirer, performance declines from deal to
deal. While not contradicting those findings, in this paper
we show that some acquirers persistently perform above or
below average and thereby generate or destroy value by
doing deals. To get a sense of the shape of the acquisition
skill distribution, Fig. 1, Panel A presents the frequency chart
of the estimated acquirer fixed effects for the occasional
acquirer sample, and Panel B does the same for the frequent
acquirer sample. The distribution is reasonably symmetric. If
one interprets the estimated fixed effects as firm-specific
acquisition skill, there is a great degree of variation in
acquisition ability. While most of the mass is naturally
around the mean, there are also many extreme performers.
To shed more light on the extreme performers and
their attributes, we examine the identity of the highest
and lowest fixed effect acquirers. Table A.5 in the Internet
Appendix provides information on the top ten and bottom
ten acquirers sorted by acquirer fixed effects for the
occasional and frequent acquirer subsamples (we do not
perform this for the full sample as most of the extreme
performers have conducted only one deal, and their fixed
effects are less precisely estimated). We report the identity
of the acquirer, the estimated fixed effect, the average
CAR (RET), the average residual CAR (RETRES), and the
acquirer’s industry affiliation. Naturally, negative (positive)
fixed effects are associated with negative (positive) CARs,
though the relation is not monotonous given that the
estimated fixed effects are after controlling for firm- and
deal-specific characteristics. For example, in the frequent
acquirer sample, AT&T Corporation has the second largest
fixed effect of 15.52% with an average return of 1.16%, and
Cisco Systems Inc. has a fixed effect of 9.94% but an
average CAR of 1.05%. This pattern persists in the
occasional serial acquirer subsample. Interesting observa-
tions emerge when we consider the industry affiliation of
the best and the worst acquirers. Specifically, using Fama-
French 48 industry groupings, we do not find a great deal
of overlap in the industry classifications of the top ten and
bottom ten acquirers. This could suggest that industry
characteristics, which are subsumed by the firm fixed
effects, may have a role to play. To establish whether
certain industries are systematically associated with high/
low fixed effects acquirers, we regress the estimated fixed
effects on a set of Fama-French 48 industry dummies. We
find that the industry dummies are jointly significant.
However, the R2 (adjusted R2) of these regressions are
only 1.67% (0.53%), 3.70% (1.66%), and 13.38% (2.52%) for
the full, occasional, and frequent acquirer samples respec-
tively, meaning that only a small fraction of the variation
in acquirer fixed effects can be explained by industry
affiliation.17 These results further underpin the idea that17 This conclusion is further substantiated by the fact the inclusion of
industry fixed effects in the baseline regressions of Table 1 has a very
modest effect on the explanatory power of those models.forces that are unique to an organization, and not its
environment or the top management team, determine
extraordinary acquisition performance.
Taken together, our results have important implications
for the M&A literature. Specifically, our results imply that
despite the wealth of studies on M&A returns, the litera-
ture appears to have missed that the drivers of the
variation in acquisitions gains are to a large extent firm-
specific. Did 30 years of empirical M&A research get it
wrong? We do not think this is the case. Existing studies
on the determinants of takeover gains are highly informa-
tive. It is just that the effects they document do not appear
to be first-order ones. For instance, Moeller, Schlingemann,
and Stulz (2004) size effect in acquirer returns is attributed
to greater agency problems in large firms. While one
should be able to detect this governance quality in the
cross-section of acquirer returns (as one does), it does not
seem that these effects should be dominating. Similarly,
many of the deal characteristics do not appear to be the
major drivers of acquirer returns. For example, Travlos'
(1987) method of payment effect in acquirer returns is
attributed to the adverse selection of issuing equity, and,
as such, is a manifestation of acquirer stand-alone value
re-setting. But normally, we should not expect this stand-
alone value revelation to dwarf the value implications of
the deal itself (particularly for frequent acquirers, who
regularly reveal private information about their value
through payment method choices). Again, this is not to
say that the effects identified by prior literature are
unimportant. In fact, the size effect and the method of
payment effect we pointed out here are among the most
robust determinants of acquirer returns in various studies.
Moreover, in the results reported in the Internet Appendix
(Table A.6), we find that the effects of various determi-
nants of acquirer returns used in Table 1 continue to
remain significant in a firm fixed effects specification,
where the identification is coming from within-firm var-
iation in those variables. This suggests that prior findings
on these determinants of acquirer returns are not simply
capturing time-invariant firm-specific heterogeneity.
Nevertheless, our message is that we are missing a much
bigger piece of the puzzle, and that it appears to be firm-
specific. We hope our findings will inspire further research
in this direction.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we show that a large proportion of the
variation in acquirer returns can be explained by a firm-
specific, time-invariant factor. In fact, the explanatory
power of the acquirer fixed effects matches and, in some
cases, even overshadows that of many of the major firm-
and deal-specific characteristics combined. Economically,
there is a wedge of over 6% between the 25th and 75th
percentiles of acquirer fixed effects, which is equivalent to
$184 million ($28 million) in incremental shareholder
value creation for a mean-(median)-sized acquirer at deal
announcement. We further show that acquirer returns are
persistent over time. Extraordinary good acquirers con-
tinue to make good acquisitions, while bad acquirers
continue to perform poorly. Persistence in acquirer returns
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Fig. 1. Distribution of acquirer fixed effects. The figures depict the frequency distribution of the estimated acquirer fixed effect for the occasional acquirer
(Panel A) and the frequent acquirer (Panel B) samples. The full sample includes all domestic M&A transactions completed during the period 1990–2011
from the Thomson Financial SDC M&A Database. Occasional acquirers are defined as those having completed two or more deals over a three-year window.
Frequent acquirers are defined as those having completed at least five deals over a three-year window, consistent with Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller
(2002). The graphs are drawn using histograms and the kernel density estimation (curved line). Acquirer fixed effects are estimated using the regression
model (4) of Table 2. Similar to Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012), the fixed effects are normalized so that the mean value is zero. This does not alter the shape of
the distribution and its variance. In Panel A, an outlier (eMedSoft.com with a fixed effect of 76.07%) has been removed.
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shape these returns, as we continue to find persistence in
the component of acquirer returns that is orthogonal to
the known determinants.
We further examine the economic forces behind the
statistical concept of acquirer fixed effects/persistence in
acquirer returns. We investigate whether the fixed effectscan be attributed to particular CEOs or the characteristics
of the acquiring firm’s broader management team. We find
that acquirer returns continue to be persistent even under
different CEOs. Further, various slow-moving attributes of
the top management team found to be important in the
management science literature do not explain the fixed
effect away. Firm fixed effects are also independent of
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industry affiliation, reinforcing the idea that factors unique
to a firm and not its environment drive the variation in
acquirer returns.
Firm-specific heterogeneity in acquirer returns is con-
sistent with several non-mutually exclusive explanations.
First, it could reflect acquisition skill in the form of
organizational knowledge or processes with respect to
acquisitions. For instance, expertise residing in internal
M&A/corporate development teams, or particular practices
in terms of post-merger integration could be the elusive
driver of acquisition performance. Second, our results can
also reflect some bidder-specific synergies, for instance,
derived from the nature of the firm's assets or its business
model that are particularly well-suited for acquisitions.
Finally, it is also possible that there is path-dependence in
acquisition success, and persistence is generated endogen-
ously whereby prior successes facilitate future acquisi-
tions. We hope our findings inspire further investigation
into these and other potential sources of persistent
acquirer returns. A close-up examination of the best and
worst acquirers that can be identified as part of our
research design could serve as a potential starting point.
Appendix. Variable deﬁnitionsVariable Definition
Panel A: Return variablesCAR (2, þ2) Cumulative abnormal return of the acquiring
firm stock over the event window (2, þ2)
surrounding the announcement date. The
return is calculated using the market model
with the benchmark being the CRSP value-
weighted index. The model parameters are
estimated over the (300, 91) period
prior to the announcement.Future RET Average CAR (2, þ2) to all the acquisitions
made by an acquirer over the next k calendar
years, where k¼(1, 2, 3, 4, 5).Past RET Average CAR (2, þ2) to all the acquisitions
made by an acquirer over the last three
calendar years.RETRES Average residual from an OLS regression of
CAR specified in Table 1.Panel B: Acquirer characteristicsAcquirer size The market value of the acquiring firm’s
equity 11 days before the announcement
date in $US dollar million. The data are
obtained from CRSP.Tobin’s Q Market value of the acquiring firm’s assets
divided by book value of its assets for the
fiscal year prior to the acquisition. The
market value of assets is equal to book value
of assets plus market value of common stock
minus book value of common stock minus
balance sheet deferred taxes. The data are
obtained from both CRSP and Compustat.Leverage The sum of the acquiring firm’s long-term
debt and short-term debt divided by themarket value of its total assets measured at
the end of the fiscal year prior to the
acquisition. The data are obtained from both
CRSP and Compustat.Free cash flow The acquiring firm’s operating income
before depreciation minus interest expense
minus income tax plus changes in deferred
taxes and investment tax credits minus
dividends on both preferred and common
share divided by its book value of total
assets at the fiscal year-end before the
announcement date from Compustat.Sigma Standard deviation of the market-adjusted
daily returns of the acquirer’s stock over a
200-day window (210, 11) from CRSP.Run-up Market-adjusted buy-and-hold return of the
acquirer’s stock over a 200-day window
(210, 11) from CRSP.Panel C: Deal characteristicsPublic Indicator variable: one if the bid is for a
public target and zero otherwise.Private Indicator variable: one if the bid is for a
private target and zero otherwise.Subsidiary Indicator variable: one if the bid is for a
subsidiary target and zero otherwise.All cash Indicator variable: one if the payment is
pure cash and zero otherwise.Stock Indicator variable: one if the payment
includes stock and zero otherwise.Relative size The deal value from Thomson Financial SDC
divided by the market value of the bidding
firm’s equity 11 days prior to the
announcement date from CRSP.Relatedness Indicator variable: one if the bidder and the
target are operating in the same industries
with a common two-digit Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) code and zero
otherwise. Data from Thomson Financial
SDC.Hostile Indicator variable: one if the deal is
classified as ‘hostile’ by Thomson Financial
SDC and zero otherwise.Tender offer Indicator variable: one if the deal is a tender
offer and zero otherwise. Data from
Thomson Financial SDC.Panel D: Management team characteristicsTeam size The size of the acquiring firm’s top
management team. It equals the number of
officers with a listed title above the vice
president level in the most recent fiscal year
prior to the announcement date. Data from
Execucomp.CEO dominance CEO salary and bonus divided by the average
salary and bonus of other team members for
the most recent fiscal year prior to the
announcement date. Data from Execucomp.Average tenure The average number of years for which top
team members have worked in the acquiring
firm prior to the announcement date. Data
from Execucomp.Tenure heterogeneity The coefficient of variation of the top team
members’ tenures.Average age The average age of the top team members
measured at the end of the most recent
fiscal year prior to the announcement date.
Data from Execucomp.
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